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A New Imperialism? Evaluating Russia’s Acquisition 
of Crimea in the Context of National and 
International Law 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In November 2013, after some progress toward greater 
economic union between Ukraine and the European Union, then-
current President Yanukovych suspended Ukraine’s preparations for 
a trade deal with the European Union, instead choosing closer ties 
with Russia.1 During the following three months, a variety of 
protests took place with some physical confrontations also 
occurring.2 On February 18, 2014, the confrontations between 
protestors and police officers reached their bloodiest day yet, leading 
to the deaths of at least eighteen people, with casualties on both 
sides.3 In the aftermath of the violence, President Yanukovych fled 
from the country and was replaced by an interim leader, Oleksandr 
Turchynov, who acted as president until elections were held in May.4 
Hours after Yanukovych fled, he was impeached by Ukraine’s 
parliament for abusing his powers.5 Russia sent forces to the Crimea 
region of Ukraine, despite repeated claims by Putin that there were 
“no Russian units in eastern Ukraine . . . . All this is being done by 
the local residents.”6 According to Putin, the presence of soldiers in 
Ukraine had been required so that the Crimeans could choose in a 
 
 1.  Marta Shokalo, Ukraine Crisis: Police Storm Main Kiev ‘Maidan’ Protest Camp, 
BBC (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26249330. 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Daisy Sindelar, Was Yanukovych’s Ouster Constitutional?, RADIO FREE EUR. RADIO 
LIBERTY (Feb. 23, 2014), http://www.rferl.org/content/was-yanukovychs-ouster-
constitutional/25274346.html. 
 5.  Ukraine President Yanukovich  Impeached, AL JAZEERA (Feb. 22, 2014, 7:12 PM 
GMT), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2014/02/ukraine-parliament-ousts-
president-yanukovich-2014222152035601620.html. 
 6.  Kathy Lally, Putin’s Remarks Raise Fears of Future Moves Against Ukraine, WASH. 
POST (Apr. 17, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/putin-changes-course-
admits-russian-troops-were-in-crimea-before-vote/2014/04/17/b3300a54-c617-11e3-bf7a-
be01a9b69cf1_story.html. 
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referendum whether to remain with Ukraine or join Russia.7 
However, there are reports that President Putin had authorized the 
invasion of Ukraine even before the government collapsed.8 Prior to 
the referendum, Russia significantly increased its military presence in 
Crimea by increasing the number of troops on the peninsula to 
around twenty-two thousand.9 The results of the referendum were 
incredibly in favor of joining Russia, with over ninety-five percent of 
the voters choosing reunification.10 Crimean election officials 
declared that participation in the vote exceeded eighty-
three percent.11 
Western governments and the interim Ukrainian prime minister 
Yatsenyuk rejected the referendum, with the prime minister declaring 
the vote a “circus” with Moscow as the “stage direct[or].”12 Indeed, 
Russia’s significant military presence was cited as one of the reasons 
that the United States and Western nations would not recognize the 
results of the referendum as legitimate.13 Though the United States 
acknowledged that it expected the ethnic Russian population to vote 
in favor of joining Russia, it took issue with the process that had 
been used: the United States claimed the process violated the 
Ukrainian Constitution, “occurred under duress of Russian military 
intervention,” and was “administered under threats of violence and 
intimidation from a Russian military intervention that violates 
 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Matthew Schofield, Russian News Report: Putin Approved Ukraine Invasion Before 
Kiev Government Collapsed, MCCLATCHYDC (Feb. 21, 2015, 6:08 AM), 
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2015/02/21/257386/russian-news-report-ukraine-invasion. 
html. Novaya Gazeta, a relatively independent investigative newspaper in Russia, supposedly 
gained access to documents detailing the strategy for invading Ukraine planned weeks before 
the government collapsed. Id. 
 9.  Carol Morello, Will Englund & Griff Witte, Crimea’s Parliament Votes to Join 
Russia, WASH. POST (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/crimeas-
parliament-votes-to-join-russia/2014/03/17/5c3b96ca-adba-11e3-9627-c65021d6d572_ 
story.html. 
 10.  Carol Morello, Pamela Constable & Anthony Faiola, Crimeans Vote to Break Away 
from Ukraine, Join Russia, WASH. POST (Mar. 16, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
world/ 2014/ 03/16/ccec2132-acd4-11e3-a06a-e3230a43d6cb_story.html. 
 11.  Morello, Englund & Witte, supra note 9. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
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international law.”14 In addition, Yatsenyuk claimed the actual vote 
allowed individuals with foreign passports to vote, lacked proper 
monitoring, and was occurring in the presence of armed men.15 
CNN photographers captured at least one instance of a voter 
dropping two papers into the ballot box.16 
President Putin recognized Crimea’s independence the day 
following the referendum, despite the significant sanctions that had 
been imposed on Russia by the West.17 The Supreme Rada of 
Crimea, the region’s parliament, held a session declaring 
independence, although “[m]asked men in body armor” blocked 
journalists’ access to the meeting.18 The Crimean Supreme Rada 
nationalized Ukrainian state property and requested recognition 
from the United Nations.19 On March 21, the Russian parliament 
approved the annexation of Crimea,20 and President Putin signed the 
bill completing the annexation shortly thereafter.21 The United 
Nations, unable to pass a Security Council resolution22 due to 
Russia’s veto power,23 resorted to a General Assembly resolution 
 
 14.  Press Release, The White House, Statement by the Press Secretary on Ukraine 
(Mar. 16, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/03/16/statement-
press-secretary-ukraine; Laura Smith-Spark, Diana Magnay & Nick Paton Walsh, Ukraine 
Crisis: Early Results Show Crimea Votes to Join Russia, CNN (Mar. 16, 2014, 7:52 PM ET), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/16/world/europe/ukraine-crisis/. 
 15.  Smith-Spark, Magnay & Walsh, supra note 14. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Jim Heintz, Crimea Parliament Declares Independence from Ukraine After 
Referendum, HUFFINGTON POST (May 17, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/ 
03/17/crimea-parliament-declares-independence_n_4977584.html. Recognition of Crimea 
occurred “just hours after the United States and the European Union announced asset freezes 
and other sanctions against Russian and Ukrainian officials involved” in Crimea. Id. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Russia Officially Annexes Crimea away from Ukraine with Signature from Vladimir 
Putin, CBSNEWS (Mar. 21, 2014, 8:13 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/russia-
annexes-crimea-away-from-ukraine-with-signature-from-vladimir-putin/. 
 21.  Timothy Heritage & Darya Korsunskaya, Russia Rules out Handing back Crimea, 
Expands War Games, REUTERS (Mar. 17, 2015, 1:29 PM EDT), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/us-ukraine-crisis-crimea-russia-idUSKBN0MD0Z220150317. 
 22.  S.C. Draft Res. S/2014/189, U.N. Doc. S/2014/189 (Mar. 15, 2014). The draft 
resolution specifically reaffirmed Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial borders and declared that 
the referendum was not valid and should not be recognized by any nation. Id. at ¶¶ 1, 5. 
 23.  U.N. SCOR, 69th Sess., 7138th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV/7138 (Mar. 15, 
2014). The final vote was thirteen votes to one with one abstention but because Russia is a 
permanent member of the council, the resolution was not adopted. Id. 
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calling upon states not to recognize a change in Crimea’s status after 
the referendum.24 
The actions of Russia in Crimea, including its military presence 
on the peninsula and its encouragement of the referendum, violated 
Ukrainian domestic law, Russia’s international obligations under the 
U.N. Charter, and Russia’s obligations under treaties with Ukraine. 
Furthermore, the process did not conform to the requirements of 
Russia’s own Federal Constitutional Law on the Acceptance of New 
Territories into the Russian Federation. Kosovo is an example of 
recent precedent for unilateral declarations of independence. 
However, the situation in Ukraine was not analogous to Kosovo and 
does not support the legality of the referendum held in Crimea, 
contrary to the claims made by President Putin and the 
Russian government. 
Part II of this paper will examine the historical means that have 
been recognized by nations as methods of acquiring new territory. 
Part III will examine the rights and abilities of parts of nations to 
unilaterally declare their independence and examine whether the 
process used in Crimea and Sevastopol conformed to both Ukrainian 
domestic law and international law. Part IV will discuss whether 
Russia’s acquisition of Crimea complies with its international legal 
obligations, both as a member of the United Nations and with 
regards to its treaties. Part V will consider Russian domestic law to 
determine if the process used by Russia complied with its own 
domestic legal requirements. Part VI will conclude. 
II. INTERNATIONAL PRECEDENT ON TERRITORIAL ACQUISITION 
International law recognizes several different methods of 
acquiring title to territory. While some of the methods are no longer 
very applicable to modern claims for territory, there remain many 
controversies regarding who the sovereign controller is over islands, 
land subject to border disputes, and the arctic and Antarctic 
regions.25 Disputes over ownership of territory have frequently led to 
armed conflict in the past, while settlement of these disagreements 
 
 24.  G.A. Res. 68/262, ¶ 6 (Mar. 27, 2014). The resolution was passed with 100 votes 
to 11 with 58 abstentions. U.N. GAOR, 68th Sess., 80th plen. mtg. at 17, U.N. Doc. 
A/68/PV.80 (Mar. 27, 2014). 
 25.  LORI F. DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 376 (5th ed. 2009). 
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based on international law can lead to peaceful negotiations and 
solutions.26 Indeed, international proceedings, in both courts and 
arbitration, frequently resolve disputes concerning boundaries and 
title to land and islands.27 The main methods of acquiring territory 
differ depending on the source cited—for the purposes of this 
discussion, occupation, accretion, cession, conquest, and prescription 
will be described below.28 
A. Occupation 
Occupation refers to the act of acquiring territory that is not 
under the sovereignty of another state—it is one of the original 
modes of acquisition because title is not derived from another state.29 
During the colonization of North America, the European naval 
powers relied on the Roman concept of terra nullius (nobody’s land) 
to claim vast swathes of land on the new continent.30 In general, 
occupation requires both that the territory be terra nullius and that 
the appropriation of territory be real or effective.31 Real or effective 
possession generally requires an “announced intention to acquire[] 
and actual settlement or occupation with the assertion of 
governmental authority.”32 Thus, the act must be a state act or an act 
 
 26.  Id. at 376–77. 
 27.  JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 215 
(8th ed. 2012); see also Brian Taylor Sumner, Territorial Disputes at the International Court of 
Justice, 53 DUKE L.J. 1779 (2004) (detailing a variety of cases that the International Court of 
Justice has heard on territorial and boundary disputes and various theories the Court has 
applied in its decision-making). 
 28.  Compare CRAWFORD, supra note 27, at 240 (accretion), with DAMROSCH ET AL., 
supra note 25, at 382 (succession). A state can also establish title to territory by demonstrating 
that it is a successor to the prior state that held title to the territory but that has dissolved or 
disappeared or from which the state seceded. Id. While other issues related to succession are 
more complex, such as assumption of debts and assets and other international obligations, it is 
important to note that succession does not alter the borders that existed between the now-
defunct state and neighboring countries—the title of all of the succeeding states cannot exceed 
the title that the defunct state held. Id. at 382–83. Brownlie also acknowledges judicial 
adjudication as a possible mode of acquisition, although it would likely also fit under the 
cession umbrella. CRAWFORD, supra note 27, at 229. 
 29. 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 686 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 
9th ed. 1992). 
 30.  DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 25, at 377. 
 31.  NORMAN HILL, CLAIMS TO TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
RELATIONS 146 (1945). 
 32.  Id. at 147. 
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acknowledged by a state—the acts of individuals do not confer 
territory to a state.33 The European powers did not require that the 
land not be inhabited, instead terra nullius referred to territory that 
was yet unclaimed by European states.34 In modern times, the vast 
majority of the planet, particularly the areas in which humans can 
live, has fallen under the sovereignty of a nation, so it is unlikely that 
discovery of terra nullius will be used in any circumstances except for 
minor islands of the sea or for claims to parts of Antarctica.35 
However, modern cases relating to a prior claim of occupation or 
discovery can still arise and require a court to investigate events that 
potentially occurred centuries prior.36 In an advisory opinion, the 
International Court of Justice deemed that terra nullius, both as 
used in modern times and as used in the period of colonization, 
could only refer to lands that were not “inhabited by tribes or 
peoples having a social and political organization.”37 Even other 
periods of discovery or occupation often included agreements with 
local rulers regarding cession of territory.38 The modern U.S. view is 
that discovery alone does not give title to land—it must be 
accompanied by some form of effective occupation.39 
B. Accretion 
Accretion refers to natural geological processes that increase 
territory—sedimentary deposits on a shoreline or volcanic eruptions 
on islands (potentially creating new islands).40 Accretion also includes 
gradual changes in the flow of rivers but not sudden acts that alter 
the course of a river, such as avulsion.41 Accretion also, however, 
 
 33.  1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 29, at 687. 
 34.  DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 25, at 377. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  CRAWFORD, supra note 27, at 215. 
 37.  Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 39 ¶ 80 (Oct. 16). 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  CRAWFORD, supra note 27, at 223. 
 40.  Id. at 240. If such islands are in the high seas, they do not belong to any state and 
may be acquired through occupation. 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 29, 
at 698. 
 41.  HILL, supra note 31, at 162–63. In this context, avulsion refers to the sudden 
removal of land or soil by floods or changes in the course of a river. Avulsion Definition, 
DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/avulsion (last visited Oct. 
17, 2015). 
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includes artificial formations such as embankments, dykes, and 
similar constructs.42 
C. Cession 
It seems that the preferred modern method of acquiring territory 
is through treaties with the prior owner of title to the territory in 
question. Prior cessions of territory were frequently part of the peace 
treaty that a defeated country was forced to sign—while such treaties 
were valid in the past, modern treaties are illegitimate if they are 
procured under the threat or use of force.43 Title to territory is often 
granted by means of purchase or in exchange for other benefits.44 
Indeed, this method also has significant history in the United States, 
through the purchases of Louisiana from France, southern Arizona 
from Mexico, and Alaska from Russia and through the Adams-Onís 
Treaty with Spain granting Florida and the Oregon Treaty with 
Great Britain fixing the northern border of the United States.45 
Treaties dividing territory have also been argued in front of the 
International Court of Justice regarding Libya and Chad,46 Botswana 
and Namibia,47 and Indonesia and Malaysia.48 Access to the 
International Court of Justice in settling territorial disputes directly 
coincides with the U.N. mandate to settle disputes by peaceful 
means.49 Central to the idea of cession is the principle that a state 
cannot transfer more territory than it possesses: nemo dat quod 
non habet.50 
D. Conquest 
Prior to general prohibitions on the use of force, conquest 
frequently resulted in changes to title to territory.51 Early in the 
 
 42.  1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 29, at 696. 
 43.  Id. at 681. 
 44.  DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 25, at 365. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Territorial Dispute (Libya v. Chad), Judgment, 1994 I.C.J. 6 (Feb. 3). 
 47.  Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots. v. Namib.), Judgment, 1999 I.C.J. 1045 (Dec. 13). 
 48.  Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan & Pulau Sipadan (Indon./Malay.), Judgment, 2002 
I.C.J. 625 (Dec. 17). 
 49.  U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶¶ 1–2. 
 50.  CRAWFORD, supra note 27, at 227. 
 51.  DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 25, at 379. 
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twentieth century, the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Stimson 
Doctrine strongly opposed both war as a tool of national policy and 
recognition of territorial transfers occurring as a result of war.52 
Following the introduction of the U.N. Charter and its general 
prohibition on the use of force,53 the ability to rely on military 
conquest to gain title to territory has effectively ended. This 
prohibition on conquest was made even clearer in the Declaration on 
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relationships and 
Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations.54 In the declaration, the General Assembly affirmed 
the duty of each state to “refrain in its international relations from 
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any State . . . . Such a threat or use of force 
constitutes a violation of international law.”55 In particular, the 
declaration noted that the proscription against the use of force 
included using it in “territorial disputes and problems concerning 
frontiers of States.”56 Finally, the declaration states that: 
The territory of a State shall not be the object of military 
occupation resulting from the use of force in contravention of the 
provisions of the Charter. The Territory of a State shall not be the 
object of acquisition by another State resulting from the threat or 
use of force. No territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or 
use of force shall be recognized as legal.57 
Thus, while conquest was once an accepted manner of acquiring new 
territory,58 it no longer fits under the legal regime established by the 
United Nations and other doctrines of the twentieth century. 
 
 52.  HILL, supra note 31, at 162. 
 53.  U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
any state.”). 
 54.  G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625 (XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970). 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  See, e.g., United States v. Huckabee, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 414, 434–35 (1873) 
(“Power to acquire territory either by conquest or treaty is vested by the Constitution in the 
United States. Conquered territory, however, is usually held as a mere military occupation 
until the fate of the nation from which it is conquered is determined, but if the nation is 
entirely subdued, or in case it be destroyed and ceases to exist, the right of occupation 
becomes permanent, and the title vests absolutely in the conqueror. Complete conquest, by 
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E. Prescription 
Similar to common law principles of adverse possession, 
international law recognizes prescription, or the transfer of title after 
a second state effectively and peacefully administers the territory.59 
This was affirmed in a dispute between the United States and the 
Netherlands.60 The Court of Arbitration examined the history of the 
Island of Palmas and determined that prior to the grant of the island 
to the United States by Spain, title had passed to the Netherlands 
because of the long, continuous, and peaceful period of sovereignty 
that the Netherlands Indian Government exercised and displayed 
with regard to the island.61 The general requirements of prescription 
are: (1) displays of state authority without recognition of other state 
sovereignty; (2) public, peaceful, and uninterrupted possession; and 
(3) persisting possession (that is, over a period of many years).62 In 
addition, the original title holder must acquiesce to the possession by 
the new state: this acquiescence can be both positive (an express 
declaration that the state believes the new state holds title) or 
negative (an absence of activity by the former title holder in the area 
and a lack of protesting against the purported new owner).63 
III. SELF-DETERMINATION AND UNILATERAL DECLARATIONS 
OF INDEPENDENCE 
One of the key questions regarding the events that occurred in 
Crimea is the legality of Crimea’s declaration of independence from 
Ukraine. The starting point in analyzing the referendum that 
occurred in Crimea and the subsequent declaration of independence 
by the Crimean legislature is the Constitution of Ukraine. However, 
international law recognizes that there are times when unilateral 
 
whatever mode it may be perfected, carries with it all the rights of the former government, or 
in other words, the conqueror, by the completion of his conquest, becomes the absolute 
owner of the property conquered from the enemy, nation, or state. His rights are no longer 
limited to mere occupation of what he has taken into his actual possession, but they extend to 
all the property and rights of the conquered state, including even debts as well as personal and 
real property.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 59.  DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 25, at 383. 
 60.  Island of Palmas Case (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928). 
 61.  Id. at 866–71. 
 62.  CRAWFORD, supra note 27, at 231. 
 63.  Id. at 232. 
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declarations of independence may be legal despite domestic law. In 
analyzing these events, two cases are of prime importance—the 
Canadian Supreme Court’s analysis of the situation in Quebec in 
199864 and the International Court of Justice’s analysis of the 
Kosovo situation in 2010.65 Both of these cases help to show the 
current international law framework regarding the unilateral 
declaration of independence of a portion of a country against the 
country’s wishes. 
A. Ukrainian Law 
The Constitution of Ukraine provides that the Autonomous 
Republic of Crimea has the authority to “organise and hold [] local 
referendums”66 and recognizes that referendums are an expression of 
the will of the populace.67 In accordance with this, the Constitution 
of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea grants the Supreme Rada of 
Crimea the power to “mak[e] . . . a decision about holding a 
republican (local) referendum”68 and “set[] up and hold[] . . . 
republican (local) referendums concerning questions left to the 
direction of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.”69 For the 
referendum to be legal, it would need to address a matter that is 
authorized to Crimea under the Constitution of Ukraine.70 
Furthermore, the Constitution of Ukraine is supreme over the 
Constitution of Crimea and acts of the Supreme Rada of Crimea.71 
The Constitution of Ukraine states that “Ukraine shall be a unitary 
state”; that the “territory of Ukraine within its present borders shall 
 
 64.  Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.). 
 65.  Accordance with Int’l Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Indep. in Respect of 
Kos., Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403 (July 22). 
 66.  KONSTYTUTSIIA UKRAINY [KONST. UKR.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 138(2) (Ukr.), 
http://www.kmu.gov.ua/document/110977042/Constitution_eng.doc (official translation). 
 67.  Id. art. 69. 
 68.  KONSTITUTSIIA AVTONOMNOI RESPUBLIKI KRYM [KONST. ARK] 
[CONSTITUTION] art. 26(2)(3) (Crimea), http://www.rada.crimea.ua/constitution/soder_ 
constit.html (translation by author). 
 69.  Id. art. 18(1)(7) (translation by author). 
 70.  KONST. UKR. art. 134. 
 71.  Id. art. 135; see also KONST. ARK art. 28 (“The regulatory-legal acts of the 
Supreme Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea . . . concerning matters . . . shall be 
made in accordance with the Constitution of Ukraine and Ukrainian laws, the acts of the 
President of Ukraine, and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine . . . .”). 
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be indivisible and inviolable”;72 and that the “territorial structure of 
Ukraine shall be based on the principles of unity and integrity of the 
State territory [and] the combination of centralization and 
decentralization in the exercise of the state power.”73 Crimea is an 
important part of Ukraine’s territory and is described as “an integral 
constituent part of Ukraine.”74 In addition, the Ukrainian 
Constitution directly addresses potential changes in its territorial 
boundaries: “[a]lterations to the territory of Ukraine shall be 
resolved exclusively by the All-Ukrainian referendum.”75 Finally, any 
changes to the Crimean Constitution must be approved by the 
Supreme Rada of Ukraine.76 
B. Quebec 
The Canadian Supreme Court had the opportunity to address 
three questions with regard to Quebec: (1) whether Quebec could 
unilaterally secede from Canada under the Constitution of Canada; 
(2) whether international law and the right to self-determination 
allow Quebec to unilaterally secede from Canada; (3) if there is a 
conflict between domestic and international law on the right of 
Quebec to unilaterally secede from Canada, whether domestic or 
international law takes precedence in Canada.77 Because the Court 
found no conflict between domestic and international law regarding 
Quebec’s right to secede, the Court did not address the third 
question.78 While the determination of the Court regarding 
Canadian law is not entirely relevant to the present discussion, the 
analysis of international law provided is quite beneficial in 
determining the status of Crimea’s actions. One point from its 
discussion of Canadian law is quite relevant to the situation in 
Ukraine—even a clear majority of Quebecers voting in favor of 
secession would not change the legality of the action under Canadian 
 
 72.  KONST. UKR. art. 2. 
 73.  Id. art. 132. 
 74.  Id. art. 134. 
 75.  Id. art. 73 (emphasis added). 
 76.  Id. art. 135. 
 77.  Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 218 (Can.). 
 78.  Id. at 223. 
12.MCDOUGAL.AA-2 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/4/2016  12:26 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2015 
1858 
domestic law.79 This is so regardless of the strength of the majority 
voting in favor of secession.80 However, a clear majority voting in 
favor of secession would need to be addressed by negotiations 
among the provinces of Canada in order to allow Quebec to secede, 
if it could do so while still respecting the rights of others and finding 
a proper reconciliation of the majority of the population of Quebec 
and the majority of the population of Canada.81 “The continued 
existence and operation of the Canadian constitutional order cannot 
remain indifferent to the clear expression of a clear majority of 
Quebecers that they no longer wish to remain in Canada.”82 Quebec 
could suggest secession and then seek to obtain it through a process 
of negotiations with the other provinces of Canada.83 
The Canadian Supreme Court determined that unilateral 
secession is only applicable in international law “where ‘a people’ is 
governed as part of a colonial empire; where ‘a people’ is subject to 
alien subjugation, domination[,] or exploitation; and possibly where 
‘a people’ is denied any meaningful exercise of its right to self-
determination within the state of which it forms a part.”84 If none of 
these apply, “peoples are expected to achieve self-determination 
within the framework of their existing state.”85 If the government of 
a state “represents [all] of the people . . . within its territory . . . 
equal[ly] and without discrimination,” it “is entitled to maintain its 
territorial integrity” and expect that other states will recognize that 
integrity.86 While an unconstitutional declaration of secession could 
possibly lead to a de facto secession, the viability of that secession 
would require recognition by the international community.87 
In addressing the second question, the Court notes that 
“international law does not specifically grant component parts of 
sovereign states the legal right to secede unilaterally from their 
 
 79.  See id. at 220–21. 
 80.  Id. at 221. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. at 267. 
 83.  Id. at 268. 
 84.  Id. at 222. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. at 222–23. 
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‘parent’ state.”88 Because international law does not specifically grant 
a right of unilateral secession nor explicitly deny the right, it seems to 
defer to domestic law for determination of the circumstances in 
which an entity could secede from a state.89 Self-determination poses 
a notable exception to this general principle in certain 
circumstances.90 However, the general rule is that self-determination 
must be exercised in accordance with the sovereignty of existing 
states and their territorial integrity.91 
When the right of self-determination is pursued through internal 
means (within the existing state), there is, in general, no conflict. 
External self-determination, however, can be exercised “in only the 
most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined 
circumstances.”92 In particular, the right to self-determination does 
not “authoriz[e] or encourag[e]” actions “that would dismember or 
impair . . . the territorial integrity or political unity” of an existing 
independent state.93 The main exceptions to the prohibition on 
external self-determination are colonial and oppressed peoples 
(including those subject to alien subjugation).94 A third potential 
avenue for asserting a right to external self-determination relates to 
the prior two in that people may be “blocked from the meaningful 
exercise of [their] right to self-determination internally.”95 While the 
Canadian Supreme Court did not determine whether this third 
circumstance actually created a right to unilateral secession, it found 
that the situation in Quebec clearly did not approach the threshold: 
Quebecers were not being attacked physically or suffering violations 
of their fundamental rights.96 Furthermore, Quebecers had served as 
the Prime Minister of Canada for eighty percent of the prior fifty 
years and held significant positions at all levels of government and 
were adequately represented in all branches of government.97 
 
 88.  Id. at 277. 
 89.  Id. at 277–78. 
 90.  Id. at 278. 
 91.  Id. at 280–81. 
 92.  Id. at 282. 
 93.  Id. at 283. 
 94.  Id. at 284–85. 
 95.  Id. at 285. 
 96.  Id. at 286. 
 97.  Id. at 286–87. 
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Because Quebec was not “denied meaningful access to government 
to pursue [its] political, economic, social[,] and cultural 
development,” it had no “right, under international law, to secede 
unilaterally from Canada.”98 
Finally, the Court acknowledged that a region may illegally 
secede, but then achieve legitimacy through international 
recognition.99 While international law could adapt to recognize the 
new political and factual reality, this would not affect the legality of 
the actions taken by the region in unilaterally seceding.100 The fact 
that an act may eventually be legally recognized does not grant a 
right to engage in the act initially.101 
C. Kosovo 
The International Court of Justice received a request from the 
General Assembly of the United Nations to rule on whether 
Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia in 
February 2008 was in accordance with international law.102 Prior to 
the declaration, the Security Council had passed resolutions and 
regulations regarding the United Nations Mission in Kosovo.103 
Security Council Resolution 1244 was adopted to end the 
humanitarian issues that had been identified and the armed conflict 
that was occurring in Kosovo.104 Of note, the resolution enabled the 
“Secretary-General to establish an international civil presence in 
Kosovo,” which would help with the establishment of self-governing 
institutions.105 The resolution attempted to end the violence and 
repression that were occurring in Kosovo at the hands of Yugoslavia 
and required the withdrawal of military and police forces from 
Kosovo.106 Furthermore, the international civil presence was tasked 
with “[p]romoting the . . . autonomy and self-government in 
 
 98.  Id. at 287. 
 99.  Id. at 288. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. at 291. 
 102.  Accordance with Int’l Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Indep. in Respect of 
Kos., Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 407 (July 22). 
 103.  Id. at 426, ¶ 57. 
 104.  Id. at 426, ¶ 58. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. 
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Kosovo.”107 Starting in 2005, the Secretary-General and the Security 
Council decided that the final status of Kosovo should be 
determined.108 In the ensuing months, “delegations of Serbia and 
Kosovo addressed . . . Kosovo’s governmental and administrative 
functions, cultural heritage and religious sites, economic issues, and 
community rights,” but were not close to agreement on most of the 
issues.109 Despite additional sessions, the two groups were not able to 
progress in the negotiations.110 Because of the inability of the parties 
to come to a bilateral agreement, the Secretary-General and his 
Special Envoy decided “that the only viable option for Kosovo [was] 
independence, to be supervised . . . by the international 
community,” and drafted a procedure by which the Kosovo 
Constitution could be created.111 Despite the support of the Special 
Envoy and the Secretary-General, the Security Council was unable to 
come to a consensus on the future disposition of Kosovo.112 In 
February 2008, the Assembly of Kosovo adopted a declaration of 
independence,113 making reference to the recommendations of the 
Special Envoy.114 Serbia did not recognize the declaration and stated 
that the declaration was unlawful.115 
In ascertaining the legality of the declaration of independence, 
the International Court of Justice applied both general international 
law and Security Council resolution 1244.116 During the early 
periods of modern statehood, from the eighteenth century through 
the early twentieth century, there were many instances of regions 
declaring independence from a parent state, with no evidence that 
such a practice was considered contrary to international law.117 
Furthermore, with the creation of the United Nations, the principle 
of self-determination was given a more prominent role, particularly 
 
 107.  Id. at 427, ¶ 59. 
 108.  Id. at 430, ¶ 64. 
 109.  Id. at 431, ¶ 67. 
 110.  Id. at 431, ¶ 68. 
 111.  Id. at 432, ¶¶ 69–70. 
 112.  Id. at 433, ¶ 71. 
 113.  Id. at 434, ¶ 74. 
 114.  Id. at 434, ¶ 75. 
 115.  Id. at 435, ¶ 77. 
 116.  Id. at 436, ¶ 78. 
 117.  Id. at 436, ¶ 79. 
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as it related to the right of independence for people in colonial 
territories and those “subject to alien subjugation, domination[,] 
and exploitation.”118 And, while the Security Council had at various 
times condemned declarations of independence, those declarations 
were made regarding specific conditions that existed at the time of 
the declaration.119 Because there is no general prohibition of 
declarations of independence, the Court held that Kosovo’s 
declaration was in accordance with international law.120 
Looking to Security Council Resolution 1244, the Court noted 
that the international civil and security presence superseded the legal 
system in place in Kosovo at the time, instead setting up an 
international administration.121 This legal regime was designed to 
help the development of local self-governance in Kosovo and 
specifically was not intended to serve as a permanent governmental 
institution, although it did supersede the Serbian legal system in 
place at the time of its introduction.122 Because the resolution only 
contained provisions relating to the interim status of Kosovo and not 
its final status, the Court reasoned that the resolution did not restrict 
the ability of Kosovo to become independent—in part because only 
nineteen days after adopting resolution 1244, the Security Council 
used specific language in resolution 1251 to set the conditions 
relating to the final status of Cyprus.123 
D. Crimea’s Referendum 
When applying both domestic and international law to the 
referendum and referendum process in Crimea, several problems are 
apparent. The actual referendum itself is flawed for several reasons. 
The substance of the referendum was not a valid topic for Crimea to 
vote on. The referendum allowed two options: vote in favor of 
joining Russia as a new subject of the Russian Federation or restore 
the Constitution of the Republic of Crimea of 1992 and remain a 
 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. at 437, ¶ 81. 
 120.  Id. at 438–39, ¶ 84. 
 121.  Id. at 443, ¶ 97. 
 122.  Id. at 443–44, ¶¶ 98–100. 
 123.  Id. at 449, ¶ 114. 
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part of Ukraine.124 Joining Russia would necessarily involve seceding 
from Ukraine. As noted above, the Ukrainian Constitution states 
that the territorial integrity of the country, including Crimea as an 
integral part, is a fundamental principle of the country. Because the 
Ukrainian Constitution is supreme over the Crimean Constitution 
and acts of the Supreme Rada of Crimea, a referendum that could 
result in a violation of the Ukrainian Constitution could not be valid. 
Even more on point, the Ukrainian Constitution specifically states 
that changes to its territory must be resolved by a pan-Ukrainian 
referendum, not a referendum in the area that wishes to break away. 
Because the referendum could alter the territory of Ukraine, it was 
only the proper subject of an All-Ukrainian referendum, not an All-
Crimean referendum. The second option in the referendum, 
resulting in a return to the 1992 Constitution, does not suffer the 
same constitutional problems as does the first choice. However, 
based on the Constitution of Ukraine, changes to the Constitution 
of Crimea must be approved by Supreme Rada of Ukraine—the 
referendum vote would not change the Constitution of Crimea until 
approved by the central government of Ukraine. Thus, the 
referendum in Crimea did not comply with Ukrainian law. 
However, as noted by both the Supreme Court of Canada and 
the International Court of Justice, a declaration of independence 
that does not comport with domestic law may still be valid under 
international law. The facts of this situation, however, do not fit the 
criteria of either court. Under the reasoning of the Canadian 
Supreme Court, Crimea would only be able to secede if the citizens 
were being denied their right to exercise self-determination within 
Ukraine. This simply is not evidenced by the situation in Crimea. 
Indeed, Crimea in general had more autonomy than did other 
regions of Ukraine because of its special status as an Autonomous 
Republic.125 Using the same analysis as the Canadian Supreme Court, 
Crimeans were not, despite Russia’s assertions, suffering human 
 
 124.  Biulleten’ dlia golosovaniia na obshchekrymskom referendume 16 marta 2014 goda 
[Bulletin for the Vote on the all-Crimean Referendum of March 16, 2014], Verkhovnaia Rada 
Avtonomnoi Respubliki Krym, https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/94/ 
2014_Crimean_referendum_ballot.png. 
 125.  See KONST. UKR. arts. 134–39 (detailing the powers and authority granted to 
Crimea and its ability to enact regulation in a wide field of areas). 
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rights violations.126 While Crimeans have not had the same political 
representation as Quebecers (that is, Prime Minister for eighty 
percent of the prior fifty years), there is nothing to suggest that they 
do not receive proportional representation in Ukraine’s 
governmental bodies. Crimeans had access both to their local 
government and to the Ukrainian government—there was no 
systematic repression of the Crimean people.127 
The ruling of the International Court of Justice provides a more 
compelling case for Russia. President Putin cited Kosovo as the 
inspiration behind the Crimean referendum.128 There are several 
glaring distinctions between the two scenarios. The actions taken in 
Kosovo were multilateral in nature: the U.N., NATO, and other 
organizations all worked towards the Kosovo secession.129 Because 
Russia initially blocked any Security Council action against Serbia, 
NATO acted alone to counter Milosevic’s ethnic cleansing.130 The 
U.N. Security Council brought Kosovo under its supervision with 
 
 126.  Rep. of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights on the situation of human 
rights in Ukr., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/27/75 (Sept. 19, 2014), at Report on the human rights 
situation in Ukraine, Apr. 15, 2014, 19, 21–22 [hereinafter Situation of Human Rights in 
Ukraine]; see also U.N. SCOR, 69th Sess., 7138th mtg., supra note 23, at 5 (comments of the 
French delegate, noting the lack of any violence against the Russian minorities, despite Russia’s 
claims otherwise). 
 127.  Situation of Human Rights in Ukraine, supra note 126, at Report on the Human 
Rights Situation in Ukraine, Apr. 15, 2014, 4 (noting that there were some attacks against 
ethnic Russians, but “these were neither systematic nor widespread”). 
 128.  Ilya Somin, Why the Kosovo “Precedent” Does Not Justify Russia’s Annexation of 
Crimea, WASH. POST (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2014/03/24/crimea-kosovo-and-false-moral-equivalency/. One cannot help 
but see some perverse humor in the “Kosovo precedent” cited by President Putin, considering 
that Russia immediately recognized Crimea’s independence but still refuses to recognize 
Kosovo. Putin Compares Kosovo’s 2008 Independence to Russia’s Annexation of Crimea; Others 
Disagree, FOX NEWS (Mar. 19, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2014/03/19/putin-
compares-kosovo-2008-independence-to-russia-annexation-crimea-others/ (noting that 
despite using Kosovo as a precedent, Serbian officials believe Russia will never recognize 
Kosovo and will continue blocking it from becoming a member of the U.N.); Stephen Wilson, 
IOC Grants Full Olympic Recognition to Kosovo, YAHOO! NEWS (Dec. 9, 2014, 9:13 AM), 
http://news.yahoo.com/ioc-grants-full-olympic-recognition-kosovo-104150520.html 
(noting that more than one hundred nations have recognized Kosovo but Russia has not). 
 129.  Experts: Crimea Isn’t Comparable to Kosovo, ANADOLU AGENCY (Mar. 17, 2014, 
18:16), http://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/302263--experts-crimea-isnt-comparable-
to-kosovo. 
 130.  Valentina Pop, Merkel: Comparing Crimea to Kosovo is ‘Shameful,’ EUOBSERVER 
(Mar. 13, 2014, 11:34 AM), https://euobserver.com/foreign/123454. 
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the passage of Security Council Resolution 1244 because of the crisis 
occurring there, including the acts committed by Serbia against the 
Albanians.131 In contrast, the actions taken in Crimea have been 
unilaterally the actions of Russia. Furthermore, Kosovo was 
undergoing a humanitarian crisis—no evidence of a similar crisis with 
respect to ethnic Russians or Russian-speakers has been found in 
Crimea.132 Kosovo was experiencing “extensive and systematic 
discrimination and violation of human rights,” while in Crimea 
“there really [was] no humanitarian crisis” despite Russia’s insistence 
that Russian-speakers were in danger.133 Indeed, there may be 
evidence to the contrary.134 The eventual independence of Kosovo 
was the product of nearly a decade of negotiation and international 
oversight: the process in Crimea was dominated by Russia and 
completed in a matter of weeks. Finally, the Security Council has 
deemed various declarations of independence invalid on the basis of 
 
 131.  Interview by Jonathan Masters with John B. Bellinger III, Adjunct Senior Fellow 
for Int’l & Nat’l Sec. Law, Why the Crimean Referendum Is Illegitimate, COUNCIL FOREIGN 
REL. (Mar. 16, 2014), http://www.cfr.org/ukraine/why-crimean-referendum-
illegitimate/p32594. 
 132.  Experts: Crimea isn’t comparable to Kosovo, supra note 129. 
 133.  Id. (quoting Neil Melvin from the Stockholm International Peace Institute). 
 134.  Situation of Human Rights in Ukraine, supra note 126, at 8 (noting that residents 
in Crimea known for being “pro-Ukrainian” face intimidation and discrimination, Crimean 
Tatar leaders have been banned from entering Crimea, and there has been a deterioration with 
respect to freedom of expression, among other rights); see also Evgenii Bobrov, Problemy 
zhitelei Kryma [The Problems of the Inhabitants of Crimea], Sovet pri Prezidente Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii po razvitiiu grazhdanskogo obshchestva i pravam cheloveka [Council of the 
President of the Russian Federation on the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights] 
(Apr. 22, 2014), http://president-sovet.ru/members/blogs/bobrov_e_a/problemy-zhiteley-
kryma-/ (detailing how in the aftermath of the referendum, the only Ukrainian language high 
school in Simferopol was being changed to a Russian language school, the only Ukrainian-
Tatar philology department at a federal university was being closed, the relationships between 
Ukrainians and Russians had turned more severe, the government decided to liquidate the 
Kiev Orthodox Church, and the government reclassified Islam from a church to a protest 
ideology because some literature that was allowed in Ukraine is considered “extremist” in 
Russia). More recently, a Crimean Tatar TV station was pulled from the air after applying four 
times to re-register with Russia’s media regulator. Richard Balmforth & Pavel Polityuk, 
Silencing of Crimean Tatar TV Sparks Outcry from Rights  Bodies, Ukraine, Turkey, REUTERS 
(Apr. 3, 2015, 7:17 AM EDT), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/03/us-ukraine-
crisis-crimea-idUSKBN0MU0R520150403. Each time the license application was turned 
down for alleged mistakes, but Tatars view the refusal as retaliation for their critical stance 
against Russian rule. Id. Human rights organizations have claimed that this is just the latest in 
a series of moves to stifle Crimean Tatar media outlets and pro-Ukrainian media, with several 
journalists critical of the authorities being subject to raids, harassment, and detainment. Id. 
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the specific conditions that existed at the time of the declaration. 
This necessitates looking to the conditions that existed during the 
referendum to see if there is any reason to doubt the validity of 
Crimea’s declaration of independence. 
Prior to the referendum, Russia unilaterally entered Crimea with 
its military force, with thousands of Russian troops occupying the 
peninsula.135 In addition, an independent newspaper in Russia, 
Novaya Gazeta, published what it purported to be a strategic Russian 
document from prior to Yanukovych’s loss of power.136 The 
purported report claims that Russia “risks losing, not simply the 
Ukrainian market for the supply of energy, but, what is much more 
dangerous, even indirect control over the gas transportation system 
in Ukraine.”137 This would harm the position of Gazprom and 
significantly hurt the economy of Russia.138 The document further 
mentions that, because of the current conditions in Kiev and the 
impending failure of Yanukovych, the Russian government needed to 
reinforce the goals of those who are seeking to join Russia, 
particularly in the eastern regions (including Crimea) to encourage 
them to initiate a reunification with Russia.139 In addition, the 
document claims that Russia needed to create conditions in Crimea 
and the east that would give the process political legitimacy and a 
moral justification, and it needed to create a PR campaign to stress 
the reactionary nature of Russia’s actions.140 Finally, the report details 
the necessity of preparing conditions in Crimea and Kharkiv for 
holding referenda about greater self-governance and eventual 
opportunities to join Russia.141 Noticeably absent from the document 
are any justifications for Russia’s actions on the basis of historical ties 
 
 135.  David M. Herszenhorn, Crimea Votes to Secede from Ukraine as Russian Troops Keep 
Watch, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/17/world/ 
europe/crimea-ukraine-secession-vote-referendum.html?_r=0. 
 136.  See Andrei Lipskii, Editorial, Predstavliaetsia pravil’nym initsirovat’ prisoedinenie 
vostochnykh oblastei Ukrainy k Rossii [It is Right to Initiate the Accession of the Eastern Regions of 
Ukraine to Russia], NOVAYA GAZETA (Feb. 24, 2015, 15:56:00), http://www.
novayagazeta.ru/politics/67389.html. 
 137.  Id. (translation by author). 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Id. 
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or the protection of ethnic Russians.142 Putin has admitted that he 
“ordered special forces, marines and paratroopers to be deployed 
‘under the guise of reinforcing our military facilities in Crimea.’”143 
This seems to indicate that the impetus for annexation was not 
driven by Crimea, but rather by Russia.144 
For at least a week prior to the referendum, Ukrainian television 
stations were no longer accessible to Crimeans—Crimeans were 
limited to Russian stations that strongly criticized the “nationalists” 
and “bandits” in Kiev.145 In addition, the election “observers” from 
European right-wing parties seemed to turn a blind eye to signs of 
irregularity in the voting process: despite clear evidence of the 
military in the streets and one-sided advertising on the billboards, 
some claimed that they could not “see any evidence of pressure, 
propaganda[,] or military influence.”146 The Levada Center, which 
conducts polling in Ukraine and Russia, found that “[t]he two-
week-long propaganda and disinformation campaign . . . has had a 
powerful effect. . . . All alternative, non-official or independent 
sources of information and interpretation of the developments have 
been completely shut down.”147 In addition, it seems that Russia may 
have sent in professional agitators to stir up tensions in 
eastern Ukraine.148 
Although Crimean officials had invited the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe to observe the referendum, the 
 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Michael Birnbaum, Putin Was Surprised at How Easily Russia Took Control of 
Crimea, WASH. POST (Mar. 15, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/ 
putin-was-surprised-at-how-easily-russia-took-control-of-crimea/2015/03/15/94b7c82e-
c9c1-11e4-bea5-b893e7ac3fb3_story.html. 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Andreas Brenner, Referendum Day in Crimea’s Simferopol, DEUTSCHE WELLE 
(Mar. 16, 2014), http://www.dw.de/referendum-day-in-crimeas-simferopol/a-17500378. 
 146.  Id. (quoting Johann Gudenus, a member of parliament in Vienna who was invited 
to observe the referendum). 
 147.  Interview by Kathy Lally with Sergei Markedonov, Assoc. Professor of Reg’l Studies 
& Foreign Policy, Russian State Univ. for the Humanities, Crimean Independence Vote and 
Russian Annexation: A Primer, WASH. POST (Mar. 15, 2014), http://www.washington
post.com/world/crimean-independence-vote-and-russian-annexation-a-
primer/2014/03/14/22efa5cd-fbd6-4d3a-bebd-a85847c5fdec_story.html. 
 148.  Luke Harding & Shaun Walker, Crimea Applies to Be Part of Russian Federation 
After Vote to Leave Ukraine, GUARDIAN (Mar. 17, 2014, 8:06 EDT), http://www.
theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/17/ukraine-crimea-russia-referendum-complain-result. 
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group declined to do so because the security and human rights 
organization deemed the referendum illegal.149 The chair of the 
OSCE noted that the referendum contradicted both Ukrainian law 
and international law and thus was not valid—“the basic criteria for a 
decision in a constitutional framework were not met.”150 This 
followed several unsuccessful attempts by OSCE military observers 
to enter to investigate the alleged human rights abuses being 
perpetrated in the area.151 During the referendum, Russian troops, 
rather than a neutral, multinational force such as that present in 
Kosovo, monitored the situation.152 The Venice Commission in 
particular noted “the massive public presence of (para)military 
forces,” OSCE concerns regarding “freedom of expression,” the 
short time period “between the decision to call the referendum and 
the referendum itself,” doubts about the “neutrality of the 
authorities” (they passed a declaration of independence five days 
prior to the referendum), and the phrasing of the referendum 
question, which was not neutral, as being counter to European 
democratic standards.153 Every ballot sheet led with the option of 
joining Russia, which has been shown to inflate vote totals even in 
legitimate elections.154 Furthermore, in at least one instance, a 
 
 149.  Fredrik Dahl, Crimea Referendum Illegal, No OSCE Monitoring - Swiss, FIRSTPOST 
(Mar. 12, 2014, 1:45 IST), http://www.firstpost.com/world/crimea-referendum-illegal-no-
osce-monitoring-swiss-1429931.html. 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Id.; Peter Graff, Warning Shots Fired as OSCE Mission Turned away from Crimea, 
REUTERS (Mar. 8, 2014, 9:47 AM EST), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/08/us-
osce-shots-idUSBREA270HJ20140308; Thwarted Crimea Mission of OSCE Observers, 
EURONEWS (Mar. 15, 2014, 00:21 CET), http://www.euronews.com/2014/03/15/ 
thwarted-crimea-mission-of-osce-observers/. 
 152.  Experts: Crimea isn’t comparable to Kosovo, supra note 129. 
 153.  Whether the Decision Taken by the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic 
of Crimea in Ukraine to Organise a Referendum on Becoming a Constituent Territory of the 
Russian Federation or Restoring Crimea’s 1992 Constitution is Compatible with 
Constitutional Principles, Opinion, European Commission for Democracy Through Law 
(Venice Commission), 98th Plen. Sess., at 5, Opinion No. 762/2014 (Mar. 21, 2014). 
 154.  Carl Bialik, Many Signs Pointed to Crimea Independence Vote—But Polls Didn’t, 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Mar. 17, 2014, 5:38 AM), http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/many-
signs-pointed-to-crimea-independence-vote-but-polls-didnt/. 
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journalist engaged in an activity that might be seen as pro-Ukrainian 
faced pressure from “local defense squads.”155 
While official sources indicate that approval for the referendum 
initiative joining Crimea with Russia was over ninety-nine percent,156 
some internal Russian sources express doubt about the validity of the 
numbers.157 For example, a website post on the official page of the 
Council of the President of the Russian Federation on the 
Development of Civil Society and Human Rights, which contains a 
lengthy disclaimer from the Council indicating that the post reflects 
only the author’s views (and opinions of those he interviewed) and 
not the official views of the Council, and whose author travelled to 
Crimea about a month after the referendum, expresses serious doubt 
concerning the official results of the election.158 The opinion of 
“almost all respondent[] experts and citizens” was that most people 
in Sevastopol voted in favor of joining Russia (fifty-to-eighty 
percent).159 However, only about fifty-to-sixty percent of voters in 
Crimea as a whole were in favor of joining Russia with an overall 
participation rate of between thirty and fifty percent.160 These 
numbers are significantly lower than those officially reported 
numbers of greater than ninety-five percent approval and eighty 
percent participation.161 In addition, it appears that Crimeans voted 
for an end to the “corrupt lawlessness and thieving dominance of the 
Donetsk stooges,” rather than for joining Russia.162 
Other sources within Crimea seem to support the findings of 
inappropriate activities with regards to the voting procedures: one 
report indicates that Sevastopol experienced over one hundred 
 
 155.  Charles McPhedran & Anna Arutunyan, Crimea Votes to Join Russia; Ukrainians 
Prepare for War, USA TODAY (Mar. 17, 2014, 6:37 AM EDT), http://www.usatoday.com/ 
story/news/world/2014/03/16/crimea-referendum-ukraine-russia/6484251/. 
 156.  Morello, Constable & Faiola, supra note 10. 
 157.  Bobrov, supra note 134. 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  See supra text accompanying notes 10–11. 
 162.  Bobrov, supra note 134 (translation by author). However, once again Sevastopol 
differs from Crimea as a whole—the residents voted specifically for unification with Russia. Id. 
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percent voter turnout163 while another indicates that the actual 
overall turnout in Crimea could not have exceeded thirty percent.164 
This also seems to comport with the experiences of some of the 
minority groups in Crimea: many citizens opposed to the vote, 
notably Crimean Tatars who make up about twelve percent of the 
population, chose “to stay home rather than participate in what they 
called a rigged vote.”165 In addition, many Crimeans loyal to Ukraine 
did not vote in the referendum,166 most likely, at least in part, 
because choosing to maintain the status quo with Ukraine was not 
even an option.167 Furthermore, it seems as though many ethnic 
Ukrainians chose not to vote in the election.168 Some potential voters 
who wished to remain with Crimea chose not to vote because they 
believed that the referendum did not give them a “choice to vote 
against joining the KGB-run government” and because they did not 
feel safe voting surrounded by Russian troops.169 
That is not to say that Russia is not correct on several fronts. 
While Putin’s “claim[] that the Russian-speaking population in 
Crimea was being terrorized by rampant ultranationalist and radical 
groups”170 was false, there were attempts by the legislature in Kiev to 
undo the law protecting regional languages (that is, Russian in 
Crimea).171 Although the law was ultimately not signed, the attempts 
further alienated and incensed the relationships between Ukrainians 
and Russians in Crimea.172 
Furthermore, the ouster of president Yanukovych likely did not 
comply with the Ukrainian Constitution. Both Russia and former 
 
 163.  Over 123% of Sevastopol Residents Vote to Join Russia!, EUROMAIDAN (Mar. 17, 
2014), https://euromaidanpr.wordpress.com/2014/03/17/over-123-of-sevastopol-
residents-vote-to-join-russia/. 
 164.  Tatar Leader Says Crimean Tatars Boycotted “Referendum,” EUROMAIDAN (Mar. 
17, 2014), http://euromaidanpress.com/2014/03/17/tatar-leader-says-crimean-tatars-
boycotted-phony-referendum/. 
 165.  Herszenhorn, supra note 135. 
 166.  Crimea Exit Poll: About 93% Back Russia Union, BBC (Mar. 16, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26598832. 
 167.  Herszenhorn, supra note 135. 
 168.  Smith-Spark, Magnay & Walsh, supra note 14. 
 169.  McPhedran & Arutunyan, supra note 155. 
 170.  Herszenhorn, supra note 135. 
 171.  Crimean Independence Vote and Russian Annexation: A Primer, supra note 147. 
 172.  Id. 
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president Yanukovych considered the actions resulting in his 
departure from Ukraine as a coup and expressed concerns that the 
new leadership in Ukraine was “fascist-minded and likely to crack 
down on Ukraine’s ethnic Russian population.”173 The Ukrainian 
Constitution provides that the term of the president will only end 
early in the event of resignation, inability to fulfill the duties due to 
health reasons, removal from office by impeachment, or death.174 
Resignation must be personally announced at a meeting of the 
Supreme Rada,175 and impeachment is only applicable if the president 
commits treason or another crime.176 The process of impeachment 
requires several steps, including an investigating commission, a 
three-quarters vote to remove the president from office, and an 
opinion by the Supreme Court of Ukraine stating that the acts of 
which the president is accused are treason or another crime.177 Even 
assuming that the quick process used by the legislature had the 
necessary investigating commission and an opinion by the Supreme 
Court, the legislature clearly lacked the three-quarters vote with only 
328 out of 447 members (seventy-three percent) voting to 
impeach.178 However, even this complaint ignores the similarly 
suspect coup that led to Sergey Aksyonov, a former crime boss, 
coming to power in Crimea.179 Russia acted at least partially on the 
basis of Aksyonov’s request, despite his status as an unofficial leader 
of Crimea.180 Furthermore, even acknowledging Yanukovych as the 
legitimate president of Ukraine does not substantially help Russia’s 
argument—he specifically did not request that Russia dismember 
 
 173.  Heintz, supra note 17. 
 174.  KONST. UKR. art. 108. 
 175.  Id. art. 109. 
 176.  Id. art. 111. 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  John Balouziyeh, Russia’s Annexation of Crimea: An Analysis under the Principles 
of Jus ad Bellum, LEXISNEXIS: INT’L L. BLOG (Apr. 14, 2014, 08:09 AM), 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/international-law/b/international-law-blog/ 
archive/2014/04/14/russia-s-annexation-of-crimea-an-analysis-under-the-principles-of-jus-
ad-bellum.aspx. 
 179.  Ilya Somin, Crimea and the Morality of Secession, WASH. POST: VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/ 
wp/2014/03/07/crimea-and-the-morality-of-secession/. 
 180.  Ukraine Crisis: Crimea Leader Appeals to Putin for Help, BBC (Mar. 1, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26397323 (noting that Russia would “not leave 
unnoticed” Aksyonov’s request). 
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Ukraine and annex Crimea, but instead considered it a 
“major tragedy.”181 
Considering Ukrainian domestic law and the standards of 
Reference re Secession of Quebec and Accordance with International 
Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of 
Kosovo, Crimea’s unilateral secession is not justified by either 
domestic law or by international law. The referendum and Russia’s 
influence on the process make the declaration of independence 
highly suspect—there were no valid reasons to ram the process 
through in such a quick manner. 
IV. ANALYSIS OF RUSSIA’S ACQUISITION UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
International law derived from a variety of sources points against 
the legality of Russia’s actions with respect to Ukraine and Crimea. 
Importantly, the United Nations Charter and General Assembly 
Resolutions, several treaties between Russia and Ukraine, and the 
Budapest Memorandum all present Russia with obligations to 
respect the territorial boundaries of Ukraine. 
A. The United Nations 
One of the main purposes of the United Nations is “[t]he 
“develop[ment of] friendly relations among nations based on respect 
for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples”182 
and promoting higher standards of living, human rights, and full 
employment “[w]ith a view to the creation of conditions of stability 
and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations 
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and 
self-determination of peoples.”183 This idea was further stated in 
Article 1 of both the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, which states that “[a]ll peoples have the right of 
self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their 
 
 181.  Ukraine Crisis: Viktor Yanukovych Decries Crimea ‘Tragedy,’ BBC (Apr. 2, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26857734 (noting that “had [Yanukovych] 
remained in power, he would have tried to prevent the referendum”). 
 182.  U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 2. 
 183.  Id. art. 55. 
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political status and freely pursue their economic, social[,] and 
cultural development.”184 However, the United Nations has also 
recognized limits to the right of self-determination: 
[The right of self-determination] shall not be construed as 
authorizing or encouraging any action that would dismember or 
impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of 
sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in 
compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples and thus possessed of a Government 
representing the whole people belonging to the territory without 
distinction of any kind.185 
Furthermore, as already noted above, General Assembly 
Resolution 2625 (XXV) essentially confirmed the status of conquest 
as an illegitimate method of acquiring land, in particular stating that 
“[n]o territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force 
shall be recognized as legal” and that attempts to disrupt national 
and territorial unity or to interfere in the domestic affairs of another 
nation are incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations.186 
The illegitimacy of conquest as a method for acquiring land was 
further affirmed in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe.187 The participating states, 
including the Soviet Union, agreed to “respect each other’s 
sovereign equality . . . including . . . the right . . . to territorial 
integrity,”188 “refrain from any acts constituting a threat of force or 
direct or indirect use of force,”189 “regard as inviolable all one 
another’s frontiers” and “refrain from any demand for, or act of, 
seizure and usurpation of part . . . of the territory of any 
participating State,”190 “respect the territorial integrity of each of the 
participating States,” “refrain from making each other’s territory the 
 
 184.  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec. 
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 185.  G.A. Res. 50/6, at 3 (Nov. 9, 1995). 
 186.  G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 54. 
 187.  Final Act Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe, Helsinki, Aug. 1, 1975. 
 188.  Id. at (1)(a)(I.). 
 189.  Id. at (II.). 
 190.  Id. at (III.). 
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object of military occupation,”191 and “refrain from any 
intervention . . . in the internal . . . affairs falling within the domestic 
jurisdiction of another participating State.”192 
The United Nations Charter is founded upon peaceable 
resolution of disputes.193 One of the key elements of maintaining 
peace is the respect that each state is required to have for the 
territorial integrity of other states.194 The attempted response of the 
Security Council195 and the actual response of the General 
Assembly196 to Russia’s intervention in Ukraine indicate the overall 
view of international law, and particularly the view of the United 
Nations: while self-determination is a valid interest of peoples, it is 
not carte blanche to intervene in the affairs of another state, 
recognize the secession of part of that state, and then annex the 
newly “independent” state. 
B. Treaties between Russia and Ukraine 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia and Ukraine 
signed several treaties regarding their relationship to each other and 
the conditions for Russia’s continued use of its naval bases in 
Sevastopol. Two treaties in particular detail Russia’s obligations 
towards Ukraine with respect to its territorial integrity and 
sovereignty: the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership 
between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, and the Partition 
Treaty on the Status and Conditions of the Black Sea Fleet 
(extended by the Kharkiv Pact). 
The Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership between 
the Russian Federation and Ukraine was signed in May 1997, ratified 
in March 1999, and entered into force the next month.197 Of 
 
 191.  Id. at (IV.). 
 192.  Id. at (VI.). 
 193.  U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 3. 
 194.  Id. art. 2, ¶ 4. 
 195.  S.C. Draft Res. S/2014/189, supra note 22. 
 196.  G.A. Res. 68/262, supra note 24. 
 197.  Dogovor o druzhbe, sotrudnichestve i partnerstve mezhdu Rossiiskoi Federatsiei i 
Ukrainoi [Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership between the Russian Federation 
and Ukraine], Russ.-Ukr., May 31, 1997, BIULLETEN’ MEZHDUNARODNYKH DOGOVOROV 
(Bulletin of International Treaties) 1999, Nо. 7 (Russ.). Interestingly, Ukraine registered the 
treaty with the U.N. on October 2, 2014. Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership 
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particular note, the treaty states that the two countries will “honour 
each other’s territorial integrity and . . . acknowledge the inviolability 
of the borders existing between them”198 and that the relationship 
between the two countries is founded “on the principles of mutual 
respect; sovereign equality; territorial integrity; inviolability of borders; 
peaceful settlement of dispute; non-use of force or threat of force; . . . 
[and] non-interference in internal affairs [of the other country].”199 
Furthermore, the countries agreed to abstain from taking part in or 
supporting any actions directed against the other country and from 
“enter[ing] into any agreement with third countries that is directed 
against the other.”200 While the treaty originally had a duration of ten 
years, it automatically renewed unless one of the two contracting states 
notified the other of its desire to end the treaty.201 
The two countries also agreed to the Partition Treaty on the 
Status and Conditions of the Black Sea Fleet to establish Russia’s 
ability to use Sevastopol and other military bases in Crimea. It was 
similarly agreed to in May 1997 and entered into force in July 
1999.202 Once again, Russia agreed to “respect the sovereignty of 
Ukraine, obey its laws, and not allow interference in the internal 
business of Ukraine.”203 Furthermore, keeping the fleet in the Black 
Sea “must not contradict the laws of Ukraine,”204 and the military 
units that Ukraine has allowed on its territory should only conduct 
exercises within the areas that have been specifically set aside for 
Russian troops.205 This treaty had a term of twenty years,206 but it was 
 
between Ukraine and the Russian Federation (Russ.-Ukr.), May 31, 1997, U.N.T.S. 
Registration Number I-52240. Although no U.N.T.S. volume number has been established 
for the treaty, the text in the translation as provided in the U.N. documentation under 
registration number I-52240 will be used throughout this paper. 
 198.  Id. art. 2. 
 199.  Id. art. 3. 
 200.  Id. art. 6. 
 201.  Id. art. 40. 
 202.  Soglashenie mezhdu Rossiiskoi Federatsiei i Ukrainoi o statuse i usloviiakh 
prebyvaniia Chernomorskogo flota Rossiiskoi Federatsii na territorii Ukrainy [Partition Treaty 
on the Status and Conditions of the Black Sea Fleet], Russ.-Ukr., May 28, 1997, BIULLETEN’ 
MEZHDUNARODNYKH DOGOVOROV (Bulletin of International Treaties) 1999, Nо. 10 (Russ.). 
 203.  Id. art. 6, ¶ 1 (translation by author). 
 204.  Id. art. 6, ¶ 2 (translation by author). 
 205.  Id. art. 8, ¶ 2. 
 206.  Id. art. 25. 
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explicitly extended in April 2010 for an additional twenty-five 
years.207 The Kharkiv Pact included in its introduction that the 
“Russian Federation and Ukraine, developing their relationships on 
the foundation of the principle of strategic partnership, fixed in the 
Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership between the 
Russian Federation and Ukraine” had decided to conclude the treaty 
extending the terms of the prior Partition Treaty.208 Following 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Russian legislators unilaterally ended 
the various Black Sea treaties it had concluded with Ukraine.209 
C. Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, there were still 
significant numbers of nuclear weapons in Ukrainian territory.210 In 
an effort to placate Ukraine that its nuclear weapons would not be 
needed to defend itself against possible intrusions by other countries, 
the United States, Great Britain, Russia, and Ukraine came together 
and created the Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection 
with Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons.211 Because of the accession of Ukraine to the 
nuclear non-proliferation treaty and its commitment to eliminate all 
 
 207.  Soglashenie mezhdu Rossiiskoi Federatsiei i Ukrainoi po voprosam prebyvaniia 
Chernomorskogo flota Rossiiskoi Federatsii na territorii Ukrainy [Agreement Between the 
Russian Federation and Ukraine on the Topic of Maintaining the Black Sea Fleet of the 
Russian Federation on the Territory of Ukraine], Russ.-Ukr., art. 1, Apr. 21, 2010, 
BIULLETEN’ MEZHDUNARODNYKH DOGOVOROV (Bulletin of International Treaties) 2010, 
Nо. 10 (Russ.) [hereinafter Kharkiv Pact]. 
 208.  Id. intro. (translation by author). 
 209.  See Federal’nyi Zakon RF o prekrashchenii deistviia soglashenii, kasaiushchikhsia 
prebyvaniia Chernomorskogo flota Rossiiskoi Federatsii na territorii Ukrainy [Federal Law of 
the Russian Federation on the Termination of the Action of Agreements Relating to 
Maintaining the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation on the Territory of Ukraine], 
SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federation 
Collection of Legislation] 2014, No. 14, Item 1530. 
 210.  Steven Pifer, The Budapest Memorandum and U.S. Obligations, BROOKINGS INST. 
(Dec. 4, 2014, 3:57 PM), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2014/12/04-
budapest-memorandum-us-obligations-pifer. 
 211.  See Permanent Reps. of the Russian Federation, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland & the United States of America, Letter dated Dec. 7, 
1994 from the Permanent Representatives of the Russian Federation, Ukraine, the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the 
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/49/765-S/1994/1399 
(Dec. 19, 1994) [hereinafter Budapest Memorandum]. 
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nuclear weapons from its territory, Russia, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States “reaffirm[ed] their commitment to Ukraine . . . to 
respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of 
Ukraine.”212 Furthermore, the three nations “reaffirm[ed] their 
obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, and that 
none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in 
self-defense or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations.”213 It would seem that one of the key elements 
necessary to secure Ukraine’s cooperation in eliminating its nuclear 
arsenal was the security assurances provided by Russia and the 
other nations.214 
The United States and Russia further cemented their 
commitment to Ukraine in a joint statement concerning the 
expiration of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of 
Strategic Offensive Arms.215 In the statement, the two countries 
recognized the value of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to the 
success of the START Treaty and “confirm[ed] that the assurances 
recorded in the Budapest Memoranda will remain in effect after 
December 4, 2009.”216 Following Russia’s actions in Crimea, the 
United States and Ukraine issued a joint statement in which the U.S. 
affirmed its commitment to Ukraine and condemned Russia for not 
keeping its commitments to Ukraine through its military actions on 
the peninsula;217 however, it is important to note that the United 
States has in the past stated that “the Memorandum is not legally 
binding” although it “take[s] [the Memorandum’s] political 
commitments seriously.”218 
 
 212.  Id. at Annex I, ¶ 1. 
 213.  Id. at Annex I, ¶ 2. 
 214.  Pifer, supra note 210. 
 215.  BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE SPOKESMAN, PRN: 2009/1230, 
U.S.-RUSSIA JOINT STATEMENT ON EXPIRATION OF THE START TREATY (2009). 
 216.  Id. 
 217.  Joint Statement by the United States and Ukraine, EMBASSY OF UKRAINE IN 
HUNGARY, Mar. 25, 2014, http://mfa.gov.ua/en/news-feeds/foreign-offices-news/20572-
spilyna-zajava-ukrajini-ta-spoluchenih-shtativ-ameriki. 
 218.  Press Release, Belarus: Budapest Memorandum, U.S. Embassy in Minsk (Apr. 12, 
2013), http://minsk.usembassy.gov/budapest_memorandum.html (addressing the Budapest 
Memorandum in connection with U.S. sanctions directed towards securing the human rights 
of Belarusians, not advantages for the United States). 
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D. Application to Russia’s Actions in Ukraine and Its Acquisition 
of Crimea 
It is hard to see any justification under international law for 
Russia’s actions with respect to Crimea. Its obligations to respect 
Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty, and borders were enshrined 
repeatedly in the U.N. Charter, in its treaties with Ukraine, and in 
the Budapest Memorandum. Russia had an obligation to respect 
Ukraine’s territorial integrity and its existing borders. Furthermore, 
it had pledged not to interfere in Ukraine’s domestic affairs. 
By entering Ukraine under the false pretenses of solving a 
humanitarian crisis and by further blockading Ukrainian troops 
inside military bases, Russia violated Ukraine’s sovereignty.219 
Furthermore, by recognizing the Crimean referendum and then 
absorbing Crimea into itself, Russia did not respect the existing 
borders of Ukraine; it instead intentionally modified the borders. 
Moreover, while Russia was allowed to have soldiers on Crimea, they 
were limited to specific areas and could not be used against 
Ukraine’s wishes.220 Ukraine noted the use of military force in a 
manner not consistent with the approved locations or 
Ukraine’s wishes.221 
Russia’s strongest arguments that it did not violate the 
prohibitions against the use of force and interference in the affairs of 
Ukraine are not entirely without merit, but they are ultimately 
unpersuasive. President Putin claimed that Russian troops were 
necessary to protect the ethnic Russian population from Ukrainian 
nationalists.222 Humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to 
 
 219.  Embassy of Ukraine to Japan, On Violations of Ukraine’s Laws in Force and of 
Ukrainian-Russian Agreements by Military Units of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian 
Federation in the Territory of Ukraine, MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF. UKR. (Mar. 3, 2014, 03:57), 
http://mfa.gov.ua/en/news-feeds/foreign-offices-news/18622-shhodo-porusheny-
chinnogo-zakonodavstva-ukrajini-ta-ukrajinsyko-rosijsykih-ugod-vijsykovimi-formuvannyami-
chf-rf-na-teritoriji-ukrajini. 
 220.  Id. 
 221.  Id. (noting a variety of circumstances in which Ukrainian forces were blocked by 
servicemen and vessels of the Russian Federation and in which Russian servicemen were 
located in areas that had not been approved). 
 222.  Vladimir Putin, Vladimir Putin Answered Journalists’ Questions on the Situation in 
Ukraine, PRESIDENT RUSS. (Mar. 4, 2014, 15:40), http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/ 
news/20366 [hereinafter Putin, Situation in Ukraine]. It is interesting to see Russia’s 
arguments in light of President Putin’s remarks concerning Syria. Vladimir V. Putin, Editorial, 
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protect might provide some credence to Russia’s legal argument that 
it not only had the right to intervene, but also had the obligation to 
do so;223 however, the assertion that Russians were in danger is 
simply not supported by the facts evidenced by any non-Russian 
sponsored news agencies or humanitarian organizations.224 Even 
Russian agencies do not necessarily support Russia’s assertions that 
ethnic Russians were under attack or in danger.225 
Russia has also argued that it had the permission of President 
Yanukovych to enter the country to protect the citizens.226 There is 
some validity to this argument. As mentioned above, the 
impeachment and removal from office of Yanukovych likely did not 
comply with the Ukrainian Constitution.227 However, even if he were 
still ostensibly the head of the Ukrainian government, he likely could 
not unilaterally invite in the Russian army for the protection of 
Crimeans—at a minimum it would have required the acquiescence of 
the legislative body.228 In addition, after Yanukovych abdicated his 
responsibilities and fled, he lost his legitimacy as the president of 
Ukraine, which occurred prior to Yanukovych requesting assistance 
 
A Plea for Caution from Russia, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2013/09/12/opinion/putin-plea-for-caution-from-russia-on-syria.html?_r=2 (“[F]orce is 
permitted only in self-defense or by the decision of the Security Council. Anything else is 
unacceptable under the United Nations Charter and would constitute an act of aggression. . . . 
It is alarming that military intervention in internal conflicts in foreign countries has become 
commonplace for the United States.”). 
 223.  See, e.g., Gareth Evans, From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to 
Protect, 24 WIS. INT’L L.J. 703 (2006). 
 224.  See, e.g., Crimea: Attacks, ‘Disappearances’ by Illegal Forces, HUMAN RTS. WATCH 
(Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/14/crimea-attacks-disappearances-
illegal-forces (detailing episodes in which pro-Crimean independence forces are attacking and 
abducting those in favor of Ukraine, including an incident in which one of the perpetrators 
admitted to being a member of Russian security forces); Situation of Human Rights in 
Ukraine, supra note 126, at Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine, Apr. 15, 2014 
(noting that while there were attacks against ethnic Russians, they were not widespread nor 
systematic, but noting that there were credible allegations of harassment, arrest, and torture 
against those who did not support the referendum). Furthermore, one of the human rights 
missions to Crimea was turned back by the authorities until March 14. Id. at Report on the 
Human Rights Situation in Ukraine, Apr. 15, 2014, 9. 
 225.  See Bobrov, supra note 134. 
 226.  Putin, Situation in Ukraine, supra note 222. 
 227.  See supra text accompanying notes 174–75. 
 228.  Balouziyeh, supra note 178 (quoting a partner of an international law firm in Kiev). 
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from the Russian government.229 The Ukrainian parliament adopted 
this view, declaring that Yanukovych “self-abdicated,” requiring it to 
instate an interim government.230 Regardless, Russia’s actions in 
Ukraine overstepped even what Yanukovych would have allowed—
there was no invitation to monitor a referendum to decide whether 
Crimea should depart from Ukraine and join Russia nor was there an 
invitation to annex Crimea. 
None of Russia’s arguments address its other fundamental 
obligation to Ukraine—respect for its territorial integrity and its 
borders. Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed that it did not 
breach the Budapest Memorandum obligations because “Ukraine’s 
loss of its territorial integrity was a result of complicated internal 
processes” in which Russia had no part.231 This is neglecting the 
significant part Russia had in “monitoring” the elections, spreading 
misinformation about the dangers posed by Ukraine to ethnic 
Russians, and the further damage it did to Ukraine by 
acknowledging the results of the referendum. In essence, Russia 
claims that Ukraine’s territorial integrity was lost by the referendum, 
not by its acknowledgement of the referendum or subsequent 
annexation of Crimea. By acknowledging the referendum in the face 
of overwhelming opposition from most nations of the world and 
then voting to absorb Crimea, Russia violated its obligations under 
the U.N. Charter, its treaties with Ukraine, and the 
Budapest Memorandum. 
V. ANALYSIS OF RUSSIA’S ACQUISITION UNDER DOMESTIC LAW 
In analyzing Russia’s domestic law, one initial point should be 
noted. According to the Russian Constitution, “[generally] 
recognized [principles and] norms of international law and 
international treaties . . . of the Russian Federation [are an integral] 
 
 229.  Jen Psaki, Daily Press Briefing, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 28, 2014), 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2014/02/222750.htm. 
 230.  Balouziyeh, supra note 178. 
 231.  Statement by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Regarding Accusations of 
Russia’s Violation of Its Obligations Under the Budapest Memorandum of 5 December 1994, 
MINISTRY FOREIGN AFFAIRS RUSS. FED’N (Apr. 1, 2014), http://mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/ 
arh/b173cc77483edeb944257caf004e64c1?open. 
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part of its legal system.”232 In the event of a conflict between 
international treaties and Russian domestic law, the international 
treaties govern.233 Thus, the prior section on Russia’s international 
treaty obligations applies equally to its obligations under 
domestic law. 
A. Russian Federal Constitutional Law 
The admission of new territory into the Russian Federation is 
governed by the Russian Constitution, article 65.234 Article 65(1) 
lists the constituent entities of the Russian Federation and is altered 
as necessary through a method prescribed by federal constitutional 
laws.235 Article 65(2) notes that “admission to the Russian 
Federation and the creation in it of a new subject shall be carried out 
according to the rules established by the federal constitutional 
law.”236 In accordance with this constitutional provision, a federal 
constitutional law was passed in 2001 to prescribe the method for 
admitting new territory into Russia.237 The law establishes the 
procedure by which foreign states or parts of foreign states can unite 
with the Russian Federation.238 Any admission of a new subject must 
take place in accordance with the Russian Constitution, international 
treaties, and federal constitutional law.239 One of the foundational 
principles of acceptance into the Russian Federation is free will.240 In 
order for a foreign state or a part of a foreign state to join the Russian 
Federation, there must be mutual agreement or a treaty between the 
 
 232.  KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 15(4) 
(Russ.) (translation by author). 
 233.  Id. 
 234.  Id. art. 65. 
 235.  Id. 
 236.  Id. art. 65(2) (translation by author). 
 237.  Federal’nyi Konstitutsionnyi Zakon RF o poriadke priniatiia v Rossiiskuiu 
Federatsiiu i obrazovaniia v ee sostave novogo sub”ekta Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Federal 
Constitutional Law of the Russian Federation on the Method of Acceptance into the Russian 
Federation and the Formation of a New Subject in the Russian Federation], SOBRANIE 
ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of 
Legislation] 2001, No. 52, Item 4916 [hereinafter Method of Acceptance]. 
 238.  Id. art. 1(1). 
 239.  Id. art. 2(1). 
 240.  Id. art. 3(1). 
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Russian Federation and the foreign state.241 Thus, by the terms of the 
federal constitutional law of 2001, a subdivision or part of a foreign 
nation cannot be admitted to Russia without the consent of the 
foreign nation—the consent of the subdivision is irrelevant.242 
Furthermore, the initiator of any offer must be the foreign 
government, not Russia or subdivisions of the foreign government.243 
This law was amended in 2005 to clarify that any proposals for 
admittance into the Russian Federation must come from both the 
legislative, or representative, body and the highest executive body of 
the potential subjects244 and that the request must contain the 
 
 241.  Id. art. 4(2) (emphasis added). 
 242.  In the weeks leading up to Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Russian legislators were 
presented with a problem. As mentioned above, Ukraine would need to initiate any 
conversations about ceding Crimea to Russia, which clearly would not happen. To overcome 
this problem, Sergei Mironov, along with other legislators, proposed a federal constitutional 
law amending the procedure for admission to the Russian Federation, particularly article four. 
Draft Federal Constitutional Law On Amending the Federal Constitutional Law on the 
Procedure of Admission to the Russian Federation and Creation of a New Subject of the 
Russian Federation in its Composition of the Russian Federation, European Commission for 
Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion No. 763/2014 at 1 (Mar. 10, 
2014), http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-REF(2014)011-e. 
Instead of requiring the acquiescence of the foreign government, an additional point would be 
added which would allow the admission of a portion of a state with the agreement of the 
portion “when it is not possible to conclude an international treaty because of the absence of 
efficient sovereign state government in the foreign state,” id., and the sub-unit of the foreign 
state would be allowed to initiate proposals for admittance to the Russian Federation. Id. at 2. 
In explaining its rationale for proposing the modifications, Russia stressed its responsibility to 
prevent acts of violence in Ukraine, its long historical ties with Ukraine, the illegitimacy of the 
Maidan uprising, and the fact that the proposed draft was in accordance with both the Russian 
Constitution and universally recognized principles of international law. Id. at 3–4. The issue 
soon became moot because, as discussed above, Crimea declared its independence from 
Ukraine following the referendum. Supra Part I. The creators of the draft law requested its 
withdrawal following the referendum and the draft law was removed a few days later. Whether 
Draft Federal Constitutional Law No. 462741-6 on Amending the Federal Constitutional Law 
of the Russian Federation on the Procedure of Admission to the Russian Federation and 
Creation of a New Subject Within the Russian Federation Is Compatible with International 
Law, Opinion, European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), 
Opinion No. 763/2014 at 12 (Mar. 21, 2014), http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/ 
documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2014)004-e. 
 243.  Method of Acceptance art. 6(1). 
 244.  Federal’nyi Konstitutsionnyi Zakon RF o vnecenii izmenenii v stat’i 10 i 11 
Federal’nogo konstitutsionnogo zakona “O poriadke priniatiia v Rossiiskuiu Federatsiiu i 
obrazovaniia v ee sostave novogo sub”ekta Rossiiskoi Federatsii” [Federal Constitutional Law 
of the Russian Federation on Introduction of Amendments to Articles 10 and 11 of Federal 
Constitutional Law “On the Method of Acceptance into the Russian Federation and the 
Formation of a New Subject in the Russian Federation”] art. 1(1), SOBRANIE 
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agreed-upon wording for the question that will be put to a 
referendum to the potential subjects of the Russian Federation.245 
Furthermore, the amendment made a variety of clarifications to the 
process for having a referendum in the interested region, specifically 
requiring a consultation with the president of Russia and affirming 
that the initiative regarding the referendum belongs to the leaders of 
the executive body of the potential subjects, the executive and 
legislative leaders are allowed to participate in efforts in support of 
the referendum but cannot use the advantages of their positions, and 
if in some of the potential areas the referendum is held invalid, the 
referendum could be repeated within the next forty-five days.246 After 
the international agreements have been signed, the President of 
Russia seeks a determination from the Constitutional Court that the 
agreement satisfies the Russian Constitution.247 If the Court finds the 
agreement satisfactory, the Duma is presented with the agreement 
for ratification and passes a federal constitutional law accepting the 
new area into the Russian Federation.248 Both a federal law ratifying 
the agreement and the federal constitutional law must be passed in 
both houses of the legislature249 and Article 65(1) of the Russian 
Constitution must be modified to include the admitted areas.250 
B. Analysis of Russia’s Actions in the Context of Its Domestic Law 
Seemingly, Russia followed its domestic process in admitting 
Crimea and Sevastopol. Crimea held a referendum regarding 
whether it should join Russia and declared its independence after 
which President Putin recognized Crimea as an “independent and 
sovereign country.”251 With Crimea ostensibly its own legal nation, 
Russia was free to negotiate with it regarding its admission into the 
Russian Federation in accordance with domestic law without 
 
ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of 
Legislation] 2005, No. 45, Item 4581 (modifying Method of Acceptance art. 10(2)). 
 245.  Id. (modifying Method of Acceptance art. 10(2)(d)). 
 246.  Id. art. 1(2) (modifying Method of Acceptance art. 11(1) and adding Method of 
Acceptance art. 11(1-1), 11(1-2), and 11(1-3)). 
 247.  Method of Acceptance art. 7(4). 
 248.  Id. art. 8(1)–8(2). 
 249.  Id. art. 9(1)–9(2). 
 250.  Id. art. 9(4). 
 251.  Heintz, supra note 17. 
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engaging in any talks with Ukraine. On March 18, leaders from 
Crimea and Sevastopol met with President Putin in Moscow and 
signed a treaty252 that, together with another federal constitutional 
law passed by the legislature, brought the two areas into the Russian 
Federation.253 The Constitutional Court determined that the 
agreement between the Russian Federation and Crimea satisfied the 
requirements of the Russian Constitution.254 The Court does not, in 
its own words, “evaluate the political expediency of entering into an 
international treaty.”255 In performing its review, the Court examined 
the various provisions of the treaty and compared them to the 
requirements of the Russian Constitution.256 While the Court did 
examine the enactment of the treaty on the Russian side, it did not 
examine the legal authority of the Crimean political body to enter 
into a treaty nor the legality of the referendum held in Crimea.257 
 
 252.  Dogovor mezhdu Rossiiskoi Federatsiei i Respublikoi Krym o priniatii v Rossiiskuiu 
Federatsiiu Respubliki Krym i obrazovanii v sostave Rossiiskoi Federatsii novykh sub”ektov 
[Treaty between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Crimea on the Acceptance of the 
Republic of Crimea into the Russian Federation and the Formation in the Russian Federation 
of New Subjects], Russ.-Rep. Crimea, Mar. 18, 2014, BIULLETEN’ MEZHDUNARODNYKH 
DOGOVOROV (Bulletin of International Treaties) 2014, Nо. 6 (Russ.). 
 253.  Federal’nyi Konstitutsionnyi Zakon RF O priniatii v Rossiiskuiu Federatsiiu 
Respubliki Krym i obrazovanii v sostave Rossiiskoi Federatsii novykh sub”ektov - Respubliki 
Krym i goroda federal’nogo znacheniia Sevastopolia [Federal Constitutional Law of the 
Russian Federation on Acceptance of the Republic of Crimea into the Russian Federation and 
the Formation in the Russian Federation of New Subjects—the Republic of Crimea and the 
Federal City of Sevastopol], SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] 
[Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 2014, No. 12, Item 1201. 
 254.  Postanovleniia Konstitutsionnogo Suda RF “Po delu o proverke konstitutsionnosti 
ne vstupivshego v silu mezhdunarodnogo dogovora mezhdu Rossiiskoi Federatsiei i 
Respublikoi Krym o priniatii v Rossiiskuiu Federatsiiu Respubliki Krym i obrazovanii v sostave 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii novykh sub”ektov” [Ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Russian 
Federation “Verifying the Constitutionality of the Pending International Treaty Between the 
Russian Federation and the Republic of Crimea on the Acceptance of the Republic of Crimea 
into the Russian Federation and the Creation Within the Russian Federation of New 
Subjects”], SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian 
Federation Collection of Legislation] 2014, No. 13, Item 1527. 
 255.  Id. (translation by the author). 
 256.  Id. 
 257.  Id. (noting that the treaty was signed by the President of the Russian Federation, 
who has power over the basic direction of both internal and external political decisions from 
the Russian Constitution, who represents Russia both inside the country and in international 
relations as the head of state, and who leads the external politics of the country, particularly 
negotiations and international agreements). No such analysis is performed of the authority of 
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Thus, all steps in Russia’s domestic process were followed in 
admitting Crimea and Sevastopol assuming, as the court did, that the 
referendum in Crimea was valid. 
There were, however, a few problems with the process Russia 
used. As noted above, admitting new subjects must be accomplished 
in accordance with international treaties of the Russian Federation. 
The ways that Russia has violated its treaty obligations, both with 
Ukraine and as a member of the United Nations, have already been 
addressed.258 Because the treaties are also an explicit part of its 
method of acquiring new subjects, Russia did not follow the 
domestic requirements, even if it did follow the overall procedure set 
out in its constitutional law. In addition, the referendum, which is 
required under the federal constitutional law, must be valid. Russian 
law does not seem to clarify who determines the validity of a 
referendum seeking to alter international borders. However, because 
of the international ramifications of such an act, widespread 
international acceptance seems to be an appropriate standard. While 
Russia acknowledged the validity of the referendum, international 
bodies including the U.N. and the E.U. did not recognize it.259 
Because the referendum was not valid, Russian law requires that a 
second referendum be held within forty-five days of the referendum 
that was deemed invalid. Finally, if the allegations made by Novaya 
Gazeta are true regarding Russia’s intentions to enter Crimea and 
agitate the population into seeking to join the Russian Federation,260 
it is possible to consider Russia’s actions to be in violation of the 
domestic law as the population of Crimea did not act of its own free 
will and did not initiate the negotiations regarding joining Russia, 
which is another requirement of Russia’s constitutional law. 
 
the corresponding signers from Crimea and Sevastopol or of the legality of entering into an 
agreement with them. 
 258.  See supra Section IV.D. 
 259.  G.A. Res. 68/262, supra note 24, at ¶ 4 (noting that the referendum had no 
validity and could not be the basis for any change in status of Crimea); Harding & Walker, 
supra note 148 (noting that President Obama told President Putin that the referendum 
“would never be recognised” and noting that Herman Van Rompuy, president of the 
European Council, and José Manuel Barroso, European Commission president, declared that 
“the referendum is illegal and illegitimate and its outcome will not be recognised”). 
 260.  See supra text accompanying notes 136–42. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The most crucial aspect in ascertaining whether Russia’s actions 
complied with international law is determining the legality of the 
Crimean referendum on independence. Crimea’s referendum did not 
comply with Ukrainian domestic law and did not comply with 
international law, largely due to the significant influence that Russia 
wielded in the process and the oddities associated with the 
referendum. However, even assuming that the referendum was valid 
and that there was no undue influence from Russia during the 
polling process, Russia had treaty obligations and a general 
obligation under the Budapest Memorandum to respect the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. 
In addition, Russia’s significant influence on the referendum 
process tainted the acquisition even from the point of view of 
Russian domestic law. Considering the purported evidence of 
Russia’s plans to invade Ukraine prior to the February events that 
ousted Yanukovych, it is hard to see much support for Russia’s 
assertion that Crimea, not Russia itself, had taken the initiative to 
request admittance to the Russian Federation. Furthermore, Russia’s 
constitutional law requires that the process occur by the free will of 
the country that is to join the Russian Federation.261 The presence of 
Russian troops monitoring a vote to decide if Crimea would join 
Russia could hardly be described as a process where the citizens were 
able to express their own free will. 
While Russia’s actions in acquiring Crimea were not in 
accordance with law, there was widespread support for the 
referendum in Crimea and Sevastopol.262 Even outside of Crimea, 
eastern Ukrainian cities saw demonstrations in support of Crimea 
and Russia, with thousands of demonstrators rallying in Donetsk, 
Kharkiv, and Odessa.263 In Crimea, tens of thousands of people 
celebrated the preliminary vote totals with fireworks, the Russian 
national anthem, and parties in the city squares.264 Many Crimeans 
see Russia as a source of new rights and opportunities—a new system 
 
 261.  In the Federal Constitutional Law, the Russian word dobrovol’no is used, which 
means voluntarily, of one’s own free will, of one’s own accord. 
 262.  Morello, Englund & Witte, supra note 9. 
 263.  Id. 
 264.  Id. 
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in which Crimea will be able to develop.265 In Simferopol, Crimea’s 
capital, a concert was held and thousands danced to live music.266 
Despite the illegality of Russia’s acts, it is hard to see a peaceful 
return of Crimea to Ukraine—for either the ethnic Russians in 
Crimea or for the Russian government. 
 
Trevor McDougal* 
  
 
 265.  Smith-Spark, Magnay & Walsh, supra note 14. One voter noted that he wanted “to 
join Russia, and live like Russians, with all their rights,” another commented that “Russia is an 
opportunity for our Crimea to develop, to bloom. And I believe that it will be so.” Id. 
 266.  McPhedran & Arutunyan, supra note 155. 
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